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8月27日学术讲座预告
( 发布日期:2019-08-18 阅读:次)

报告题目:Reconciliating Relational Contracting and Hold-up

主 讲 人:Prof. Sebastian Kranz, Ulm University

报告时间:2019年8月27日14:00

报告地点:行政楼201第一会议室


报告人简介:

Sebastian Kranz于2008年在德国莱茵-弗里德里希-威廉-波恩大学取得博士学位,自2012年起在乌尔姆大学任W3 教授职位。2008-2012年在波恩大学从事博士后工作并与2009年获评W2教授,2010-2011获考尔斯经济学研究基金会资助前往美国耶鲁大学以助理教授访问学习,2011-2012年于科隆大学担任W2 教授。主要研究方向包括管理经济学、工业企业与竞争策略、博弈论以及行为经济学等。


报告摘要:

The game theoretic analysis of relational contracts for long run relationships typically studies Pareto-optimal equilibria of infinitely repeated games. We illustrate with several examples how this equilibrium selection rules out very intuitive hold-up concerns. This becomes apparent only when moving away from the stationary environment of repeated games to more general discounted dynamic games that can have different states and can accomodate actions with long run consequences, like investments. The key problem is that Pareto-optimal equilibria don't properly reflect plausible concerns of how todays actions affect future bargaining positions within the relationship. We propose and characterize an alternative equilibrium selection based on the explicit notion that continuation play is repeatedly newly negotiated in a relationship. We illustrate how the concept naturally combines the trade-offs from relational contracting and hold-up concerns.


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